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In a continuous-time model with multiple assets described by
ca`dla`g processes, this paper characterizes superhedging prices, ab-
sence of arbitrage, and utility maximizing strategies, under general
frictions that make execution prices arbitrarily unfavorable for high
trading intensity. Such frictions induce a duality between feasible
trading strategies and shadow execution prices with a martingale
measure. Utility maximizing strategies exist even if arbitrage is present,
because it is not scalable at will.
1. Introduction. In financial markets, trading moves prices against the
trader: buying faster increases execution prices, and selling faster decreases
them. This aspect of liquidity, known as market depth [Black (1986)] or
price-impact, is widely documented empirically [Dufour and Engle (2000),
Cont, Kukanov and Stoikov (2014)], and has received increasing attention
in models of asymmetric information [Kyle (1985)], illiquid portfolio choice
[Rogers and Singh (2010), Garleanu and Pedersen (2013)] and optimal liq-
uidation [Almgren and Chriss (2001), Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Schied and
Scho¨neborn (2009)]. These models depart from the literature on frictionless
markets, where prices are the same for any amount traded. They also depart
from proportional transaction costs models, in which prices differ for buying
and selling, but are insensitive to quantities.2
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2A separate class of models [e.g., Bank and Kramkov (2011a, 2011b)] investigates the
conditions under which current prices depend on past trading activity, a distinct effect also
referred to as (permanent) price-impact. This paper focuses on temporary price-impact,
or market depth, which some authors call nonlinear transaction costs [cf. Garleanu and
Pedersen (2013)].
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The growing interest in price-impact has also highlighted a shortage of
effective theoretical tools. In these models, what is the analogue of a martin-
gale measure? Which contingent claims are hedgeable, and at what price?
How do the familiar optimality conditions for utility maximization look in
this context? In discrete time, several researchers have studied these fun-
damental questions [Astic and Touzi (2007), Pennanen and Penner (2010),
Pennanen (2011a), Dolinsky and Soner (2013)], but extensions to continuous
time have proved challenging. This paper aims at filling the gap.
Tackling price-impact in continuous-time requires to clarify two basic con-
cepts that remain concealed in discrete models: the relevant classes of trading
strategies and of dual variables. First, to retain price-impact effects in con-
tinuous time, execution prices must depend on the traded quantities per unit
of time, that is, on trading intensity, rather than on the traded quantities
themselves, otherwise price-impact can be avoided with judicious policies
[C¸etin, Jarrow and Protter (2004), C¸etin, Soner and Touzi (2010), C¸etin and
Rogers (2007)]. Various classes of trading strategies have appeared in differ-
ent models [C¸etin, Soner and Touzi (2010), Schied and Scho¨neborn (2009)],
but a generally agreed definition of what kind of strategies should be allowed
has not yet emerged. The second key concept is the relevant notion of dual
variables—the analogue of a martingale measure. The proportional transac-
tion costs literature identifies the corresponding dual variable as a consistent
prices system, a pair (S˜,Q) of a price S˜ evolving within the bid-ask spread,
and a probability Q under which S˜ is a martingale.3 Such a definition sug-
gests that with frictions, passing to the risk-neutral setting requires both a
change in the probability measure and a change in the price process.
Superlinear frictions in the sense of the present paper, such as price-
impact models, entail that execution prices become arbitrarily unfavorable
as traded quantities per unit of time grow: buying or selling too fast be-
comes impossible. As a result, trading is feasible only at finite rates—the
number of shares is absolutely continuous. This feature sets apart super-
linear frictions from frictionless markets, in which the number of shares is
merely predictable, and from models with proportional transaction costs, in
which they have finite variation.
Finite trading rates have two central implications: first, portfolio values
are well defined for asset prices that follow general ca`dla`g processes, not only
for semi-martingales. Second, immediate portfolio liquidation is impossible
and, therefore, the usual notion of admissibility, based on a lower bound
for liquidation values, is inappropriate. We define below a feasible strategy
as any trading policy with finite trading rate and trading volume, without
3These dual objects first appeared in Jouini and Kallal (1995). They were baptized
“consistent price systems” in Schachermayer (2004). See Kabanov and Safarian (2009) for
further developments.
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any lower bounds on portfolio values. In particular, this definition does not
involve the asset price. In frictionless markets, or under proportional trans-
action costs, this approach would fail for two reasons: first, the set of claims
attainable by feasible strategies would not be closed in any reasonable sense,
as a block trade is approximated by intense trading over small time intervals.
Second, portfolios unbounded from below allow doubling strategies, which
lead to arbitrage even with martingale prices.
Neither issue arises in our models with superlinear frictions. Block trades
are infeasible, even in the limit, as intense trading incurs exorbitant costs:
put differently, bounded losses imply bounded trading volume (Lemma 3.4).
The bound on trading volume in turn yields the closedness of the payoffs of
feasible strategies (Proposition 3.5), and the martingale property of portfo-
lio values under shadow execution prices, which excludes arbitrage through
doubling strategies (Lemma 5.6).
Arbitrage also occurs differently in the present setting. Unlike models
without friction or with proportional transaction costs, where an arbitrage
opportunity scales freely, superlinear frictions imply that scaling trading
rates results in a less than proportional scaling of payoffs [see Pennanen
(2011b) for more about scalable arbitrage]. In fact, in our setting (Assump-
tion 2.3) we prove a stronger result, whereby all payoffs are dominated by a
single random variable, the market bound, which depends on the friction and
on the asset price only (Lemma 3.5). This bound implies that price-impact
defeats arbitrage, if pursued on a large scale.
All these definitions and properties come together in the main superhedg-
ing result, Theorem 3.7, which characterizes the initial asset positions that
can dominate a given claim through trading, in terms of shadow execution
prices. The main message of this theorem is that the superhedging price of
a claim is the supremum of its expected value under a martingale measure
for a shadow execution price, minus a penalty, which reflects how far the
shadow price is from the base price. The penalty depends on the dual fric-
tion, introduced by Dolinsky and Soner (2013) in discrete time, and is zero
for any equivalent martingale measure of the asset price. Importantly, the
theorem is valid even if there are no martingale measures, or if the price is
not a semi-martingale.
The superhedging theorem, which does not assume absence of arbitrage,
characterizes a large class of models that do not admit arbitrage of the
second kind (strategies that lead to a sure minimal gain) even in limited
amounts. As for proportional transaction costs, this class contains any price
process that satisfies the conditional full support property Guasoni, Ra´sonyi
and Schachermayer (2008), including fractional Brownian motion.
We conclude the paper by addressing utility maximization. First, a gen-
eral theorem guarantees that optimal solutions exist. This holds true even in
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the eventual presence of arbitrage opportunities, which must be chosen opti-
mally, lest price-impact offset gains. Second, optimal strategies are identified
by a version of the familiar first-order condition that the marginal utility of
the optimal payoff be proportional to a stochastic discount factor. Techni-
calities aside, price-impact leads to a novel condition, which prescribes that
a stochastic discount factor makes the shadow execution price, not the base
price, a martingale. In models with proportional transaction costs this cri-
terion formally reduces to the usual shadow price approach for optimality
[Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe (2010)].
The rest of the paper proceeds with Section 2, which describes the model
in detail. The main theoretical tools are developed in Section 3, which proves
the market bound, the trading volume bound, the closedness of the payoff
space, and the main superhedging result. Section 4 discusses the implications
for arbitrage of the second kind, and its absence with prices with conditional
full support. Section 5 concludes with the results on utility maximization.
2. The model. For a finite time horizon T > 0, consider a filtered prob-
ability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) with F0 trivial, satisfying the usual hy-
potheses as well as F =FT . O denotes the optional sigma-field on Ω× [0, T ].
The market includes a riskless and perfectly liquid asset S0, used as nu-
meraire, hence S0t ≡ 1, t ∈ [0, T ], and d risky assets, described by ca`dla`g,
adapted processes (Sit)
1≤i≤d
t∈[0,T ]
. Henceforth, S denotes the d-dimensional pro-
cess with components Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, the concatenation xy of two vectors
x, y of equal dimensions denotes their scalar product, and |x| denotes the
Euclidean norm of x. The components of a (d+1)-dimensional vector x are
denoted by x0, . . . , xd.
The next definition identifies those strategies for which the number of
shares changes over time at some finite rate φ, hence it is absolutely contin-
uous.
Definition 2.1. A feasible strategy is a process φ in the class
A :=
{
φ :φ is a Rd-valued, optional process,
∫ T
0
|φu|du <∞ a.s.
}
.(1)
In this definition, the process φ represents the trading rate, that is, the
speed at which the number of shares in each asset changes over time, and
the condition
∫ T
0 |φu|du <∞ means that absolute turnover (the cumulative
number of shares bought or sold) remains finite in finite time.
The above definition compares to the one of admissible strategies in fric-
tionless markets as follows. On one hand, it relaxes the solvency constraint
typical of admissibility, since a feasible strategy can lead to negative wealth.
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On the other hand, this definition restricts the number of shares to be dif-
ferentiable in time, while usual admissible strategies have an arbitrarily ir-
regular number of shares.4 Note also that the definition of feasibility does
not involve the asset price at all.
With this notation, in the absence of frictions the self-financing condition
would imply a position at time T in the safe asset (henceforth, cash) equal
to:5
z0 −
∫ T
0
Stφt dt,(2)
where z0 represents the initial capital, and the integral reflects the cost of
purchases and the proceeds of sales. For a given trading strategy φ, frictions
reduce the cash position, by making purchases more expensive, and sales
less profitable. With a similar notation to Dolinsky and Soner (2013), we
model this effect by introducing a function G, which summarizes the impact
of frictions on the execution price at different trading rates:
Assumption 2.2 (Friction). Let G :Ω × [0, T ] × Rd → R+ be a O ⊗
B(Rd)-measurable function, such that G(ω, t, ·) is convex with G(ω, t, x) ≥
G(ω, t,0) for all ω, t, x. Henceforth, set Gt(x) := G(ω, t, x), that is, the de-
pendence on ω is omitted, and t is used as a subscript.
With this definition, for a given strategy φ ∈A and an initial asset position
z ∈Rd+1, the resulting positions at time t ∈ [0, T ] in the risky and safe assets
are defined as
V it (z,φ) := z
i +
∫ t
0
φiu du, 1≤ i≤ d,(3)
V 0t (z,φ) := z
0 −
∫ t
0
φuSu du−
∫ t
0
Gu(φu)du.(4)
The first equation merely says that the cumulative number of shares V it
in the ith asset is given by the initial number of shares, plus subsequent
flows. The second equation contains the new term involving the friction G,
which summarizes the impact of trading on execution prices. The condi-
tion G(ω, t, x)≥G(ω, t,0) means that inactivity is always cheaper than any
trading activity. Most models in the literature assume G(ω, t,0) = 0, but the
above definition allows for G(ω, t,0) > 0, which is interpreted as a cost of
4In the definition of feasible strategy an optional trading rate leads to a continuous,
hence predictable, number of shares, as for usual admissible strategies.
5By the ca`dla`g property of St, the function St(ω), t∈ [0, T ] is bounded for almost every
ω ∈Ω, hence the integral in (2) is finite a.s. for each φ satisfying
∫ T
0
|φt|dt <∞ a.s.
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participation in the market, such as the fees charged by exchanges to trad-
ing firms, or as a monitoring cost. The convexity of x 7→Gt(x) implies that,
excluding monitoring costs, trading twice as fast for half the time locally
increases execution costs—speed is expensive.6 Finally, note that in general
V 0t may take the value −∞ for some (unwise) strategies.
With a single risky asset and for G(ω, t,0) = 0, the above specification is
equivalent to assuming that a trading rate of φt 6= 0 implies an execution
price equal to
S˜t = St +Gt(φt)/φt,(5)
which is (since G is positive) higher than St when buying, and lower when
selling. Thus, G≡ 0 boils down to a frictionless market, while proportional
transaction costs correspond to Gt(x) = εSt|x| with some ε > 0. Yet this
paper focuses on neither of these settings, which entail either zero or linear
costs, but rather on superlinear frictions, defined as those that satisfy the
following conditions. Note that we require a strong form of superlinearity
here (i.e., the cost functional grows at least as a superlinear power of the
traded volume).
Assumption 2.3 (Superlinearity). There is α> 1 and an optional pro-
cess H such that7
inf
t∈[0,T ]
Ht > 0 a.s.,(6)
Gt(x)≥Ht|x|
α for all ω, t, x,(7) ∫ T
0
(
sup
|x|≤N
Gt(x)
)
dt <∞ a.s. for all N > 0,(8)
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Gt(0)≤K a.s. for some constant K.(9)
Condition (7) is the central superlinearity assumption, and prescribes that
trading twice as fast for half the time increases trading costs (in excess of
monitoring) by a minimum positive proportion. Condition (6) requires that
frictions never disappear, and (8) that they remain finite in finite time. By
(9), the participation cost must be uniformly bounded in ω ∈Ω. In summary,
these conditions characterize nontrivial, finite, superlinear frictions. Note
6Let g(x) =G(ω, t, x), that is, focus on a local effect. Then, by convexity, g(x)≤ (1−
1/k)g(0)+ (1/k)g(kx) for k > 1 and, therefore, (g(kx)− g(0))T/k≥ (g(x)− g(0))T , which
means that increasing trading speed by a factor of k and reducing trading time by the
same factor implies higher trading costs, excluding the monitoring cost captured by g(0).
7We implicitly assume that inft∈[0,T ]Ht is a random variable, which is always the case
if, for example, H is ca`dla`g.
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that (7) implies that S˜t in (5) becomes arbitrarily negative as φt becomes
negative enough, that is, when selling too fast. This issue is addressed in
more detail in Remarks 3.8 and 5.3 below.
The most common examples in the literature are, with one risky asset,
the friction Gt(x) := Λ|x|
α for some Λ > 0, α > 1 [see, e.g., Dolinsky and
Soner (2013)] and, in multiasset models, the friction Gt(x) := x
′Λx for some
symmetric, positive-definite, d× d square matrix Λ (here x′ stands for the
transposition of the vector x); see Garleanu and Pedersen (2013).
Remark 2.4. We conjecture that (7) could be weakened to the super-
linearity condition
lim
x→∞
Gt(x)/|x|=∞ a.s.,
using Orlicz spaces instead of Lp-estimates (i.e., Ho¨lder’s inequality). This
generalization is expected to involve substantial further technicalities for a
limited increase in generality, hence it is not pursued here.
Remark 2.5. Our results remain valid assuming that (7) holds for
|x| ≥M only, with some M > 0. Such an extension requires only minor
modifications of the proofs, and may accommodate models for which a low
trading rate incurs either zero or linear costs.
3. Superhedging and dual characterization of payoffs. Despite their sim-
ilarity to models of frictionless markets and proportional transaction costs,
superlinear frictions in the sense of Assumption 2.3 lead to a surprisingly
different structure of attainable payoffs, as shown in this section. Indeed,
the class of feasible strategies considered above, while still well defined even
in a model without frictions or with proportional transaction costs, is virtu-
ally useless in such settings, as the set of terminal payoffs corresponding to
feasible strategies is not closed in any reasonable sense.
As an example, a simple trading policy that buys one share of the risky
asset at time t and sells it at time T is not a feasible strategy in the above
sense, because it is not absolutely continuous, and in fact is discontinuous
at t and T . Yet, in frictionless markets or with transaction costs, this policy
is approximated arbitrarily well by another one that buys at rate n in the
interval [t, t+1/n] and sells at rate n on [T,T +1/n]. That is, the sequence
of corresponding payoffs converges to a finite payoff, but this limit payoff
does not belong to the payoff space of feasible strategies.
By contrast, with the superlinear frictions in Assumption 2.3, the set of
terminal values corresponding to feasible strategies is closed in a strong
sense. The intuitive reason is that approximating a nonsmooth strategy
would require trading at increasingly high speed, generating infinite costs,
and preventing convergence to a finite payoff.
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3.1. The market bound. Superlinear frictions in the sense of Assump-
tion 2.3 lead to a striking boundedness property: for a fixed initial position,
all payoffs of feasible strategies are bounded above by a single random vari-
able B <∞, the market bound, which depends on the friction G and on the
price S, but not on the strategy. This property clearly fails in frictionless
markets, where any payoff with zero initial capital can be scaled arbitrarily
and, therefore, admits no uniform bound. In such markets, a much weaker
boundedness property holds: Corollary 9.3 of Delbaen and Schachermayer
(2006) shows that the set of payoff of x-admissible strategies is bounded in
L0 if the market is arbitrage-free in the sense of the condition (NFLVR),
and a similar result holds with proportional transaction costs under the
(RNFLVR) property [Guasoni, Le´pinette and Ra´sonyi (2012)].
A central tool in this analysis is the function G∗, the Fenchel–Legendre
conjugate of G, which we call dual friction. Its importance was first recog-
nized by Dolinsky and Soner (2013), who used it to derive a superhedging
result in discrete time. G∗ is defined as8
G∗t (y) := sup
x∈Rd
(xy−Gt(x)), y ∈R
d, t ∈ [0, T ],(10)
and the typical case d = 1, Gt(x) = Λ|x|
α leads to G∗t (y) =
α−1
α α
1/(1−α) ×
Λ1/(1−α)|y|α/(α−1) [in particular, G∗t (y) = y
2/(4Λ) for α= 2]. The key obser-
vation is the following.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption 2.3, any φ ∈A satisfies
V 0T (z,φ)≤ z
0 +
∫ T
0
G∗t (−St)dt <∞ a.s.
Proof. Indeed, this follows from (4), the definition of G∗t , and Lemma 3.2
below. 
Lemma 3.2. Under Assumption 2.3, the random variable B :=
∫ T
0 G
∗
t (−St)dt
is finite almost surely.
Proof. Consider first the case d= 1. Then, by direct calculation,
G∗t (y)≤ sup
r∈R
(ry−Ht|r|
α) =
α− 1
α
α1/(1−α)H
1/(1−α)
t |y|
α/(α−1).(11)
8Note that the supremum can be taken over Qd, hence G∗ is O ⊗B(Rd)-measurable.
Note also that, under Assumption 2.3, G∗t (·) is a finite, convex function satisfying G
∗
t (x)≥
−K for all x, see the proof of Lemma 3.2.
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Noting that supt∈[0,T ] |St| is finite a.s. by the ca`dla`g property of S, and
knowing that inft∈[0,T ]Ht is a positive random variable, it follows that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
G∗t (−St)<∞ a.s.,
which clearly implies the statement. If d > 1, then note that
G∗t (y)≤ sup
r∈Rd
(
d∑
i=1
riyi−Ht|r|
α
)
≤
d∑
i=1
sup
r∈Rd
(riyi − (Ht/d)|r|
α)
(12)
≤
d∑
i=1
sup
x∈R
(xyi − (Ht/d)|x|
α)
and the conclusion follows from the scalar case. 
Since B <∞ a.s., it is impossible to achieve a scalable arbitrage: though
a trading strategy may realize an a.s. positive terminal value, one cannot get
an arbitrarily large profit by scaling the trading strategy (i.e., by multiplying
it with large positive constants) since bigger trading values also enlarge costs.
Even if an arbitrage exists, amplifying it too much backfires, because the
superlinear friction eventually overrides profits. Yet, arbitrage opportunities
can exist in limited size (cf. Section 4 below).
Limited arbitrage opportunities also appear in the frictionless models of
Fernholz, Karatzas and Kardaras (2005) and Karatzas and Kardaras (2007)
through a completely different mechanism. These models allow for arbitrage
opportunities that can lead to a possible intermediate loss before realiz-
ing a certain final gain, while requiring that wealth remains positive at all
times. As a result, an arbitrage opportunity is scalable only insofar as its
maximal intermediate loss is less than the initial capital committed to the
arbitrage. By contrast, with superlinear frictions arbitrage is limited even
though wealth may well become negative before gains are realized (cf. Def-
inition 2.1), because the superlinear friction defeats attempts to scale an
arbitrage linearly, by reducing and eventually eliminating its profitability
for larger positions.
3.2. Trading volume bound. For Q∼ P , denote by L1(Q) the usual Ba-
nach space of (d+ 1)-dimensional, Q-integrable random variables; given a
subset A of a Euclidean space, L0(A) denotes the set of (P -a.s. equivalence
classes of) A-valued random variables, equipped with the topology of con-
vergence in probability. EQX denotes the expectation of a random variable
X under Q. From now on, fix 1< β < α, where α is as in Assumption 2.3.
Let γ be the conjugate number of β, defined by
1
β
+
1
γ
= 1.
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The next definition identifies a class of reference probability measures
with integrability properties that fit the friction G and the price process
S well. Our main results (see Section 3.4) involve suprema of expectations
of various functionals under families of probability measures equivalent to
P . Ideally, all such measures should be taken (as in Theorem 3.11 below)
but on infinite Ω this leads to integrability issues. Thus, we need to single
out a family of probability measures which is large enough for the results of
Section 3.4 to hold, but also small enough to ensure appropriate integrability
properties. This is why we introduce the sets P and P(W ) in Definition 3.3
below. P identifies a set of probabilities under which some shadow execution
price has the martingale property, as explained in the proof of Theorem 5.5
and Lemma 5.6 below.
Definition 3.3. P denotes the set of probabilities Q∼ P such that
EQ
∫ T
0
H
β/(β−α)
t (1 + |St|)
βα/(α−β) dt <∞.
P˜ denotes the set of probability measures Q ∈ P such that
EQ
∫ T
0
|St|dt <∞ and EQ
∫ T
0
sup
|x|≤N
Gt(x)dt <∞ for all N ≥ 1.
For a (possibly multivariate) random variable W , define
P(W ) := {Q ∈P :EQ|W |<∞}, P˜(W ) := {Q ∈ P˜ :EQ|W |<∞}.
Under Assumption 2.3, note that P˜(W ) 6=∅ for all W by Dellacherie and
Meyer [(1982), page 266]. The next lemma shows that, if a payoff has a finite
negative part under some probability in P , then its trading rate must also
be (suitably) integrable. There is no analogue to such a result in friction-
less markets, but transaction costs Guasoni, Le´pinette and Ra´sonyi (2012),
Lemma 5.5, lead to a similar property, whereby any admissible strategy must
satisfy an upper bound on its total variation. In both cases, the intuition
is that, with frictions, excessive trading causes unbounded losses. Hence, a
bound on losses translates into one for trading volume. Lemma 3.4 is crucial
to establish the closedness of the set of attainable payoffs (Proposition 3.5
below) as well as to prove the martingale property of shadow execution
prices in utility maximization problems (see Lemma 5.6 in Section 5).
In the sequel, x− denotes the negative part of x∈R.
Lemma 3.4. Let Q ∈P and φ ∈A be such that EQξ− <∞, where
ξ :=−
∫ T
0
Stφt dt−
∫ T
0
Gt(φt)dt.
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Then
EQ
∫ T
0
|φt|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt <∞.
Proof. For ease of notation, set T := 1. Define φt(n) := φt1{|φt|≤n} ∈A,
n ∈ N. As n→∞, clearly φt(n)→ φt for all t and ω ∈ Ω, and the random
variables
ξn :=−
∫ 1
0
Stφt(n)dt−
∫ 1
0
Gt(φt(n))dt(13)
= −
d∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
Sitφ
i
t(n)[1{Sit≤0,φit≤0} + 1{Sit>0,φit≤0}
(14)
+ 1{Sit≤0,φit>0} +1{Sit>0,φit>0}]dt
−
∫ 1
0
Gt(φt(n))dt(15)
converge to ξ a.s. by monotone convergence. [Note that each of the terms
with an indicator converges monotonically, and that Gt(0) ≤ Gt(x) for all
x.] Ho¨lder’s inequality yields∫ 1
0
|φt(n)|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt
=
∫ 1
0
|φt(n)|
βH
β/α
t
1
H
β/α
t
(1 + |St|)
β dt(16)
≤
[∫ 1
0
|φt(n)|
αHt dt
]β/α[∫ 1
0
(
1
H
β/α
t
(1 + |St|)
β
)α/(α−β)
dt
](α−β)/α
≤
[∫ 1
0
Gt(φt(n))dt
]β/α[∫ 1
0
(
1
H
β/α
t
(1 + |St|)
β
)α/(α−β)
dt
](α−β)/α
.
All these integrals are finite by Assumption 2.3 and the ca`dla`g property of
S. Now, set
m :=
[∫ 1
0
(
1
H
β/α
t
(1 + |St|)
β
)α/(α−β)
dt
](α−β)/α
,
and note that, by Jensen’s inequality,∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
Stφt(n)dt
∣∣∣∣≤
∫ 1
0
|φt(n)|(1 + |St|)dt
(17)
≤
[∫ 1
0
|φt(n)|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt
]1/β
.
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Note also that if x≥ 1 and x≥ 2β/(α−β)mα/(α−β) then x1/β − (x/m)α/β ≤
x− 2x=−x. This observation, applied to
x :=
∫ 1
0
|φt(n)|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt,
implies that ξn ≤−x on the event {x≥ 2
β/(α−β)mα/(α−β) +1}. Thus,∫ 1
0
|φt(n)|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt≤ (ξn)− + 2
β/(α−β)mα/(α−β) + 1 a.s.
Letting n tend to ∞, it follows that∫ 1
0
|φt|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt≤ ξ− +2
β/(α−β)mα/(α−β) + 1,(18)
which implies the claim, since EQξ− <∞ by assumption, and EQm
α/(α−β) <
∞ from Q ∈P . 
3.3. Closed payoff space. The central implication of the previous result is
that the class of multivariate payoffs superhedged by a feasible strategy, de-
fined as C := [{VT (0, φ) :φ ∈A}−L
0(Rd+1+ )]∩L
0(Rd+1), is closed in a rather
strong sense; recall the componentwise definition of the (d+1)-dimensional
random variable VT (0, φ) in (3) and (4). Closedness is the key property for
establishing superhedging results; see, for example, Section 9.5 of Delbaen
and Schachermayer (2006) or Section 3.6 of Kabanov and Safarian (2009).
Proposition 3.5. Under Assumption 2.3, the set C ∩ L1(Q) is closed
in L1(Q) for all Q ∈P such that
∫ T
0 |St|dt is Q-integrable.
Proof. Take T = 1 for simplicity, and assume that ρn := ξn − ηn → ρ
in L1(Q) where ηn ∈ L
0(Rd+1+ ) and ξn = V1(0, ψ(n)) for some ψ(n) ∈ A are
such that ρn ∈ L
1(Q). Up to a subsequence, this convergence takes place a.s.
as well.
Lemma 3.4 implies that EQ
∫ 1
0 |ψt(n)|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt must be finite for all
n since (ξn)− ≤ (ρn)− and the latter is in L
1(Q). Applying (18) with the
choice φ := ψ(n) yields∫ 1
0
|ψt(n)|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt≤ (ρn)− +2
β/(α−β)mα/(α−β) +1.
Now, since Q ∈ P , and the sequence ρn is bounded in L
1(Q) because it is
convergent in L1(Q), it follows that
sup
n≥1
EQ
∫ 1
0
|ψt(n)|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt <∞.(19)
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Consider L := L1(Ω,F ,Q;B), the Banach space of B-valued Bochner-
integrable functions, where B := Lβ([0,1],B([0,1]),Leb) is a separable and
reflexive Banach space. The functions ψ·(n) :Ω→ B are easily seen to be
weakly measurable, hence also strongly measurable by the separability of B.
By (19), the sequence ψ·(n) is bounded in L, so Lemma 15.1.4 in Delbaen
and Schachermayer (2006) yields convex combinations
ψ˜·(n) =
M(n)∑
j=n
αj(n)ψ·(n),
which converge to some ψ˜· ∈ L a.s. in B-norm.
By the bound in (19), supnEQ
∫ 1
0 |φt(n)|(1 + |St|)dt < ∞. Now apply
Lemma 9.8.1 of Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006) to the sequence ψ˜·(n) in
the space of (d+1)-dimensional random variables L1(Ω× [0,1],O, ν), where
ν is the measure defined by
ν(A) :=
∫
Ω×[0,1]
1A(ω, t)(1 + |St|)dt dQ(ω)
for A ∈ O (which is finite by the choice of Q). This lemma yields convex
combinations ψˆ·(n) of the ψ˜·(n) such that ψˆ·(n) converges to ψ· ν-almost
everywhere and hence P ×Leb-almost everywhere. This shows, in particular,
that ψ is O-measurable.
Since ψ˜·(n) converge a.s. in B-norm, also ψˆ·(n)→ ψ˜ a.s. in B-norm, so
ψ = ψ˜, P ×Leb-a.e. and hence we may and will assume that ψ˜·(n) tends to
ψ a.s. in B-norm as well as P × Leb-a.e.
Define ξ˜n :=
∑M(n)
j=n αj(n)ξj and η˜n :=
∑M(n)
j=n αj(n)ηj . It holds that
limn→∞
∫ 1
0 ψ˜t(n)St dt=
∫ 1
0 ψtSt dt almost surely, and also
lim
n→∞
ξ˜in = limn→∞
∫ 1
0
ψ˜it(n)dt=
∫ 1
0
ψit dt a.s. for i= 1, . . . , d.
Hence, η˜in→ η
i a.s. with ηi :=
∫ T
0 ψ˜
i
t dt− ρ
i ∈ L0(R+). By the convexity of
Gt,
ρ0 = lim
n→∞
(ξ˜0n − η˜
0
n)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
[
−
∫ 1
0
ψ˜t(n)St dt−
∫ 1
0
Gt(ψ˜t(n))dt− η˜
0
n
]
= limsup
n→∞
[
−
∫ 1
0
ψ˜t(n)St dt−
∫ 1
0
Gt(ψt)dt−
∫ 1
0
Gt(ψ˜t(n))dt
+
∫ 1
0
Gt(ψt)dt− η˜
0
n
]
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=−
∫ 1
0
ψtSt dt−
∫ 1
0
Gt(ψt)dt
+ limsup
n→∞
[
−
∫ 1
0
Gt(ψ˜t(n))dt+
∫ 1
0
Gt(ψt)dt− η˜
0
n
]
.
Now Fatou’s lemma and η˜n ∈ L
0(Rd+1+ ) imply that the limit superior is
in −L0(R+) [note that Gt(·) is continuous by convexity], hence there is
η0 ∈ L0(R+) such that
ρ0 =−
∫ 1
0
ψtSt dt−
∫ 1
0
Gt(ψt)dt− η
0,
which proves the proposition. 
Corollary 3.6. Under Assumption 2.3, the set C is closed in proba-
bility.
Proof. Let ρn ∈C tend to ρ in probability. Up to a subsequence, con-
vergence also holds almost surely. There exists Q ∈ P [see page 266 of Del-
lacherie and Meyer (1982)] such that ρ, supn |ρ − ρn|,
∫ T
0 |St|dt are all Q-
integrable. Then ρn→ ρ in L
1(Q) as well, and Proposition 3.5 implies that
ρ ∈C. 
3.4. Superhedging. Finally, the main superhedging theorem. To the best
of our knowledge, Theorem 3.7 is the first dual characterization in continuous
time of hedgeable contingent claims with price-impact. Results in discrete
time include Astic and Touzi (2007), Pennanen and Penner (2010), Pennanen
(2011a), Dolinsky and Soner (2013). Our result is inspired, in particular, by
Theorem 3.1 of Dolinsky and Soner (2013) for finite probability spaces.
Note that both terminal claims and initial endowments are multivariate,
for a good reason. Due to the presence of price impact, positions in the safe
asset and in various risky assets are not immediately convertible into each
other at a fixed price. It is thus impossible to introduce, in a meaningful
way, a one-dimensional wealth process representing holdings in units of a
nume´raire—multivariate book-keeping of positions is necessary.
In the multivariate notation below, inequalities among vectors are un-
derstood componentwise: x ≤ y means that xi ≤ yi for all i. Also, for a
(d + 1)-dimensional vector x, define x¯ as the d-dimensional vector with
x¯i = (xi/x0)1{x0 6=0}, i = 1, . . . , d, while xˆ denotes the (d + 1)-dimensional
vector with components xˆi = xi, i= 1, . . . , d and xˆ0 = 1. (See Table 1 for a
summary of notation.)
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Table 1
Summary of vector notation
R Rd Rd+1
x¯= (x1/x0, . . . , xd/x0)1{x0 6=0} x= (x
0, x1, . . . , xd)
x˜= (x1, . . . , xd) xˆ= (1, x1, . . . , xd)
c cˇ= (c,0, . . . ,0)
Theorem 3.7. Let W ∈ L0(Rd+1), z ∈Rd+1 and Assumption 2.3 hold.
There exists φ ∈A such that VT (z,φ)≥W a.s. if and only if
Z0z ≥EQ(ZTW )−EQ
∫ T
0
Z0tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt,(20)
for all Q ∈ P(W ) and for all Rd+1+ -valued bounded Q-martingales Z with
Z00 = 1 satisfying Z
i
t = 0, i= 1, . . . , d on {Z
0
t = 0}.
Remark 3.8. Although the above theorem holds for general S, it has
the interpretation of a superreplication result only if S (or at least ST )
has nonnegative components and, therefore, a positive number of units of
risky positions has positive value. Otherwise, if S can take negative values,
a larger number of units does not imply a position with higher value, but
only a larger exposure.
Assume in the rest of this remark that S is nonnegative and one-dimen-
sional (for simplicity). Take φ ∈ A and consider the (optional) set A :=
{(ω, t) :φt(ω) 6= 0, St(ω)+G(ω, t, φt(ω))/φt(ω)≥ 0}, which identifies the times
at which execution prices are positive. Clearly, VT (z,φ
′) ≥ VT (z,φ) for
φ′t(ω) := φt(ω)1A. Hence, in Theorem 3.7 one may replace A by
A+ := {φ ∈A :St(ω) +G(ω, t, φt(ω))/φt(ω)≥ 0 when φt(ω) 6= 0}.
In other words, the superreplication result continues to hold by consider-
ing only trading strategies with positive execution prices at all times, be-
cause any other strategy is dominated pointwise by a strategy that trades at
the same rate when the execution price is positive, and otherwise does not
trade. The class A+ is economically more appealing as it excludes the unin-
tended consequence of (7) that St(ω)+G(ω, t, φt(ω))/φt(ω)→−∞ whenever
φt(ω)→−∞.
The proof of Theorem 3.7 in fact yields also the following slightly different
version, in terms of bounded martingales only.
Theorem 3.9. Let W ∈ L0(Rd+1), z ∈ Rd+1 and let Assumption 2.3
hold. Fix a reference probability Q ∈ P˜(W ). There exists φ ∈ A such that
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VT (z,φ)≥W a.s. if and only if
Z0z ≥EQ(ZTW )−EQ
∫ T
0
Z0tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt,(21)
for all Rd+1+ -valued bounded Q-martingales Z with Z
0
0 = 1 satisfying Z
i
t = 0,
i= 1, . . . , d on {Z0t = 0}.
Defining dQ′/dQ :=Z0T one can state Theorem 3.9 in the following form,
in which martingale probabilities Q are replaced by stochastic discount fac-
tors Z.
Corollary 3.10. Let W ∈ L0(Rd+1), z ∈ Rd+1 and Assumption 2.3
hold. Fix a reference probability Q ∈ P˜(W ). There exists φ ∈ A such that
VT (z,φ)≥W a.s. if and only if
Zˆ0z ≥EQ′(ZˆTW )−EQ′
∫ T
0
G∗t (Zt − St)dt,(22)
for all Q′≪ P with bounded dQ′/dQ and for all Rd+-valued Q
′-martingales
Z such that (dQ′/dQ)ZT is bounded.
Finally, in the case of a finite Ω Theorem 3.9 reduces to a simple version,
without any integrability conditions.
Theorem 3.11. Let Ω be finite. Let W ∈ L0(Rd+1), z ∈ Rd+1 and let
Assumption 2.3 hold. Fix any reference probability Q∼ P . There exists φ ∈
A such that VT (z,φ)≥W a.s. if and only if
Z0z ≥EQ(ZTW )−EQ
∫ T
0
Z0tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt,(23)
for all Rd+1+ -valued Q-martingales Z with Z
0
0 = 1, and satisfying Z
i
t = 0,
i= 1, . . . , d on {Z0t = 0}.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. For a (d+1)-dimensional vector x, x˜ denotes
the d-dimensional vector x˜i := xi, i = 1, . . . , d (cf. Table 1). First, assume
that VT (z,φ) ≥W . Take Q ∈ P(W ) and a bounded Q-martingale Z with
nonnegative components [more generally, it is enough to assume that ZTW
is Q-integrable and that ZT ∈L
γ(Q)], satisfying Zit = 0, i= 1, . . . , d on {Z
0
t =
0}.
Note that EQ|W | < ∞ and W
0 ≤ z +
∫ T
0 [−φtSt − Gt(φt)]dt because
VT (z,φ)≥W , hence Lemma 3.4 implies
EQ
∫ T
0
|φt|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt <∞.(24)
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Again, since VT (z,φ)≥W , it follows that
ZT (W − z)≤
∫ T
0
[−Z0TφtSt −Z
0
TGt(φt) + Z˜Tφt]dt.(25)
By (24), Fubini’s theorem applies and the properties of conditional expec-
tations imply that
EQ(ZTW )≤ zEQZT +EQ
∫ T
0
[−Z0TφtSt −Z
0
TGt(φt) + Z˜Tφt]dt
= zZ0 +
∫ T
0
EQ(−Z
0
TφtSt −Z
0
TGt(φt) + Z˜Tφt)dt
= zZ0 +
∫ T
0
EQ(−Z
0
t φtSt −Z
0
tGt(φt) + Z˜tφt)dt
= zZ0 +
∫ T
0
EQ(−Z
0
t φtSt −Z
0
tGt(φt) +Z
0
t Z¯tφt)dt
≤ zZ0 +EQ
∫ T
0
Z0tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt,
which proves the first implication of this theorem.
To prove the reverse implication, suppose there is no φ such that VT (z,φ)≥
W , which means thatW −z /∈C. Fix Q ∈ P˜(W ). The set C∩L1(Q) is closed
in L1(Q) by Proposition 3.5. The Hahn–Banach theorem then provides a
nonzero, bounded (d+1)-dimensional random variable Z˜ such that
EQ[Z˜(W − z)]> sup
X∈C∩L1(Q)
EQ[Z˜X].(26)
Since −L0(Rd+1)⊂ C, Z˜ ≥ 0 a.s., otherwise the supremum would be in-
finity. Define now the (deterministic) processes ψ(n, i) for all n ∈ N and
i= 1, . . . , d by setting ψit(n, i) := n, ψ
j
t (n, i) = 0, j 6= i for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We claim that EQZ˜
0 > 0. Otherwise, for some i > 0 one should have
EQZ˜
i > 0. By Assumption 2.3 ψ(n, i) ∈ A. By the choice of Q, we even
have VT (0, ψ(n, i)) ∈ C ∩ L
1(Q) and EQZ˜VT (0, ψ(n, i)) = nTEQZ˜
i→∞ as
n→∞, which is impossible by (26). So we conclude that EQZ˜
0 > 0. Up to
a positive multiple of Z, we may assume EQZ˜
0 = 1. Define Zt :=EQ[Z˜|Ft],
t ∈ [0, T ].
We also claim that, for all i= 1, . . . , d,
(P × Leb)(Ai) = 0
(27)
where Ai := {(ω, t) :Z
0
t (ω) = 0} \ {(ω, t) :Z
i
t(ω) = 0}.
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If this were not the case for some i, define ψi(n, i) := n1Ai , ψ
j(n, i) := 0, j 6= i.
Clearly, ψ(n, i) ∈A and VT (0, ψ(n, i)) ∈C∩L
1(Q) while EQZ˜VT (0, ψ(n, i))→
∞, n→∞, which is absurd, proving (27).
By the measurable selection theorem applied to the measure space (Ω×
[0, T ],O, P ⊗ Leb) [see Proposition III.44 in Dellacherie and Meyer (1978)],
there is an optional process χ˜(n) such that
χ˜t(n)[Z¯t − St]−Gt(χ˜t(n))≤G
∗
t (Z¯t − St)
and
χ˜t(n)[Z¯t − St]−Gt(χ˜t(n))≥G
∗
t (Z¯t − St)−
1
n
≥−K −
1
n
,(28)
for (P × Leb)-almost every (ω, t). Here K denotes the bound for
supt∈[0,T ]Gt(0) from (9). Now define χt(n) := χ˜t(n)1{|χ˜t(n)|≤N(n)} whereN(n)
is chosen such that (P × Leb)(|χ˜t(n)|>N(n))≤ 1/n
2. By Assumption 2.3,
χ(n) ∈A and by the choice of Q, VT (0, χ(n)) ∈C ∩L
1(Q). By construction,
lim
n→∞
χt(n)[Z¯t − St]−Gt(χt(n)) =G
∗
t (Z¯t − St), (P × Leb)-a.e.
Since Z, χ(n) are bounded and Q ∈ P˜ we may use Fubini’s theorem and
the lower bound in (28) allows the use of Fatou’s lemma, hence
lim inf
n→∞
EQZTVT (0, χ(n)) = lim inf
n→∞
EQ
∫ T
0
χt(n)[Z˜T −Z
0
TSt]−Z
0
TGt(χt(n))dt
= lim inf
n→∞
∫ T
0
EQ[χt(n)[Z˜t −Z
0
t St]−Z
0
tGt(χt(n))]dt
= lim inf
n→∞
EQ
∫ T
0
χt(n)Z
0
t [Z¯t − St]−Z
0
tGt(χt(n))dt
≥ EQ
∫ T
0
Z0tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt.
From (26), we infer that
zZ0 < lim sup
n→∞
[EQ(WZT )−EQZTVT (0, χ(n))]
= EQ(WZT )− lim inf
n→∞
EQZTVT (0, χ(n))
≤ EQ(WZT )−EQ
∫ T
0
Z0tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt.
This completes the proof. 
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Remark 3.12. The above proof also shows that the statements of The-
orems 3.7 and 3.9 remain valid when the class of bounded martingales is
replaced by the class of Q-martingales with ZT ∈ L
γ(Q) such that ZTW is
Q-integrable.
For a real number c, denote by cˇ the (d+1)-dimensional vector (c,0, . . . ,0)T
(cf. Table 1). The next corollary specializes Theorem 3.7 to the situation in
which a claim in cash is hedged from an initial cash position only.
Corollary 3.13. Let W ∈ L0(R), c ∈R and let Assumption 2.3 hold.
There exists φ ∈A such that V 0T (cˇ, φ)≥W a.s. and V
i
T (cˇ, φ)≥ 0, i= 1, . . . , d
if and only if
c≥EQ(Z
0
TW )−EQ
∫ T
0
Z0tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt,(29)
for all Q ∈ P(W ) and for all Rd+1+ -valued bounded Q-martingales Z with
Z00 = 1 satisfying Z
i
t = 0, i= 1, . . . , d on {Z
0
t = 0}.
To understand the meaning of (29), it is helpful to consider its statement
in the frictionless case, at least formally.9 If S itself is a Q-martingale, then
the penalty term with G∗ vanishes with the choice of Z0t := 1, Z
i
t := S
i
t , i=
1, . . . , d. It follows that, in order to super-replicateW , the initial endowment
c must be greater than or equal to the supremum of EQW over the set
of equivalent martingale measures for S. This shows that our findings are
formally consistent with well-known superhedging theorems for frictionless
markets. The results are similarly consistent with superhedging theorems
for proportional transaction costs [Kabanov and Safarian (2009)], formally
obtained with Gt(x) = εSt|x|.
3.5. Examples. With the class of superlinear frictions considered in this
article, typical contingent claims are virtually impossible to superreplicate
with certainty at a fixed price, as we now show. For example, consider the
problem of delivering a cash payoff equal to ST (the price of the risky asset)
at time T , starting from cash only. In a market without frictions, or with
proportional transaction costs, one solution is to immediately buy the share
and, therefore, the superreplication price is at most the (current) price of
the asset (or a slightly higher multiple when transaction costs are present).
But this policy is not feasible with superlinear frictions, as block trades
are forbidden. An approximate solution would be to buy at rate n over the
9The theorem does not apply to the frictionless case because G = 0 does not satisfy
Assumption 2.3, and feasible strategies differ from admissible strategies.
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period [0,1/n], but this policy incurs a positive probability that the asset
price will rapidly increase in value, and in typical models, such as geometric
Brownian motion, there is no certain upper bound on the execution price.
This discussion motivates the following result.
Example 3.14. Let µ ∈ R, σ,S0 > 0, St := S0e
(µ−σ2/2)t+σWt , Gt(x) =
λ
2Stx
2, where Wt is a Brownian motion (and Ft is its completed filtration
made right-continuous). Then a cash payoff equal to ST cannot be super-
replicated from any initial capital.
Proof. In view of Theorem 3.7 above, it is enough to show that the
right-hand side of inequality (20) takes arbitrarily large values for a suitable
family of reference probabilities Q and martingales Z.
To this end, consider Q= P and the family of exponential martingales Z
parameterized by x > 0 and n ∈N, n > 1/T with
Z0t = exp
{
−σWt∧(T−1/n) −
σ2
2
t∧ (T − 1/n)
(30)
+ 1{t≥T−1/n}
(
(x− σ)(Wt −WT−1/n)−
(x− σ)2
2
(t− (T − 1/n))
)}
and Z1t = S0Z
0
t . [In plain English, Z
0
t adds a drift of −σ (to the Brownian
motion) between 0 and T − 1/n, and a drift of x− σ between T − 1/n and
T .] In the sequel, C1,C2, . . . denotes various positive constants whose values
do not depend either on x or on n.
Notice that, for 0≤ t≤ T − 1/n,
EZ0t St = S0e
(µ−σ2)t ≤C1
and for T − 1/n≤ t≤ T ,
EZ0t St ≤C1e
(x2/2)(t−(T−1/n))+(µ−σ2/2)(t−(T−1/n))−((x−σ)2/2)(t−(T−1/n))
≤C2e
σx/n.
Similarly, for 0≤ t≤ T − 1/n,
ES20Z
0
t /St =ES0e
−2σWt−(µ−σ2/2)t−(σ2/2)t ≤C3
and for T − 1/n≤ t≤ T ,
ES20Z
0
t /St ≤C3e
((x−2σ)2/2)(t−(T−1/n))−(µ−σ2/2)(t−(T−1/n))−((x−σ)2/2)(t−(T−1/n))
≤C4.
We also have
EZ0TST ≥ S0e
(µ−σ2)(T−1/n)e(x
2/2)(1/n)+(µ−σ2/2)(1/n)−((x−σ)2/2)(1/n) ≥C5e
σx/n.
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Now set x= x(n) = n lnn/σ. Since G∗t (y) =
1
2λSt
y2, forW = (ST ,0), which
represents a cash payoff equal to the final stock price, it follows that
E(ZTW )−E
∫ T
0
Z0tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt
=E[STZ
0
T ]−
1
2λ
∫ T
0
E
[
(Z1t )
2
StZ0t
− 2Z1t +Z
0
t St
]
dt
=E[STZ
0
T ]−
1
2λ
∫ T
0
(
E
[
S20Z
0
t
St
]
− 2S0 +E[Z
0
t St]
)
dt(31)
≥C5n−
1
2λ
∫ T−1/n
0
[C3 − 2S0 +C1]dt−
1
2λn
[C4 − 2S0 +C2n]
≥C5n−C6→∞
as n→∞. As a result, the right-hand side takes arbitrarily large values,
implying an infinite superreplication price. 
The previous proof uses Theorem 3.7 to obtain a dual characterization of
superreplication prices. In fact, the same conclusion can be reached exploit-
ing the market bound obtained in Lemma 3.1.
Alternative proof. Observe that Gt(x) =
λ
2Stx
2 implies that G∗t (y) =
y2
2λSt
, whence the market bound is
B =
∫ T
0
G∗t (−St)dt=
1
2λ
∫ T
0
St dt.(32)
Thus, any strategy starting with initial capital x satisfies the bound
V 0T (x,φ)≤ x+
∫ T
0
G∗t (−St)dt≤ x+
1
2λ
∫ T
0
St dt.(33)
In particular, on the event {x+ 12λ
∫ T
0 St dt < ST }, which has positive prob-
ability for any x (because Brownian motion has full support on the space
of continuous functions starting at 0) superreplication fails for any strategy,
and for any initial capital. 
The previous example should be understood as follows: if a large position
in the risky asset needs to be acquired, it is not possible a priori to guarantee
a fixed execution price with certainty: price impact prevents the transaction
to take place instantly, while over time intervening news may lead the price
to arbitrary levels. Yet, the fact that even such a simple contract is not
superreplicable with finite wealth raises the question of which contracts have
a finite superhedging price, and the next example provides one.
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Example 3.15. Let St > 0 a.s. for all t and Gt(x) :=
λ
2Stx
2. Then, for
all k > 0, the contract that at time T pays 1λ
∫ T
0 (
√
1 + 2kλ/St − 1)dt units
of the risky asset is superreplicable from initial cash position kT .
Proof. The main idea is that this payoff is dominated by a constant
cash-flow strategy, a strategy that buys the risky asset at the rate of one
unit of the safe asset per unit of time (e.g., one dollar per second). To see
this, recall the relation between the cash flow and the trading rate
dV 0t =−φtSt dt−
λ
2
Stφ
2
t dt.(34)
Thus, a constant cash flow dV 0t =−k dt corresponds to a buying rate
φt =
1
λ
(
−1 +
√
1 +
2λk
St
)
,(35)
which yields at time T exactly 1λ
∫ T
0 (−1 +
√
1 + 2λkSt )dt units of the risky
asset. In the frictionless limit (λ ↓ 0), this strategy implies a buying rate of
φt = k/St, which yields k
∫ T
0 1/St dt units of the risky asset. 
In the above example note that, as k varies, the resulting family of payoffs
is not linear, in that while each of the above payoffs are replicable, their
multiples need not be. In particular, increasing the buying rate k does not
scale the number of units of risky asset bought proportionally, except in the
frictionless limit λ = 0. Note also that the above payoff is superreplicable
because it promises a lower number of shares when the asset price is high.
The square-root relation is of course linked to the quadratic price impact
considered in this example.
4. Arbitrage (of the second kind). Any positive payoff that is super-
hedged for strictly less than zero is an arbitrage. Such opportunities, which
start from an insolvent position and, by clever trading, yield a solvent one,
are known in the literature as arbitrage of the second kind, and date back
to Ingersoll (1987) [see also Kabanov and Kramkov (1994) in the context
of large financial markets]. This definition is used with markets frictions
in Dermody and Rockafellar (1991, 1995), and, more recently, in Ra´sonyi
(2009), Denis and Kabanov (2012), Bouchard and Taflin (2013), Bouchard
and Nguyen Huu (2013), Pennanen (2014).
The superhedging results in the previous section hold regardless of having
arbitrage opportunities or not. Consequently, they can be used to detect
arbitrage: if we find a nonnegative payoff W satisfying (29) with some c < 0
then Corollary 3.13 ensures that an arbitrage opportunity exists.
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Definition 4.1. An arbitrage of the second kind is a strategy φ ∈ A,
such that VT (cˇ, φ) ≥ 0 for some c < 0. Absence of arbitrage of the second
kind (NA2) holds if no such opportunity exists.
Note that this definition requires that S has positive components. Other-
wise, a nonnegative position in an asset with negative price [as VT (cˇ, φ)≥ 0
stipulates] cannot be interpreted as solvent.
The following theorem is a direct consequence of Corollary 3.13 and Re-
mark 3.12.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumption 2.3 hold. Then (NA2) holds if and only
if, for all ε > 0, there exists Q ∈P and an Rd+1+ -valued Q-martingale Z with
ZT ∈ L
γ(Q) such that EQ
∫ T
0 Z
0
tG
∗
t (Z¯t − St)dt < ε.
A broad class of models enjoys the (NA2) property. Let D ⊂ (0,∞)d be
nonempty, open and convex. We denote by C[t, T ](D) (resp., Cx[t, T ](D))
the set of continuous functions f from [t, T ] to D [resp., satisfying f(t) = x].
Both spaces are equipped with the Borel sets of the topology induced by
the uniform metric. Recall that a continuous stochastic process S on [t, T ]
can be understood as a C[t, T ](D)-valued random variable, and its support
is defined in this (metric) space.
Definition 4.3. A process S has conditional full support in D (hence-
forth, CFS-D) if S ∈C[0, T ](D) a.s. and
suppP (S|[t,T ] ∈ ·|Ft) =CSt [t, T ](D) a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Theorem 4.4. Let Assumption 2.3 hold with Ht := H constant. If S
has the CFS-D property, then (NA2) holds.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.6 of Maris and Sayit (2012) that for
all ε there is Q∼ P and a Q-martingale Mt evolving in D ⊂ R
d
+ such that
|St −Mt|< ε a.s. for all t. Define Z
i
t :=M
i
t for i= 1, . . . , d and Z
0
t := 1 for
all t.
In Maris and Sayit (2012) [see also Guasoni, Ra´sonyi and Schachermayer
(2008)] it is shown that ST , and hence ZT are in L
2(Q). A closer inspection
of the proof reveals that in fact there exist ZT ∈ L
p(Q) for arbitrarily large
p. Take p := max{γ,αβ/(α− β)}. Then Q is easily seen to be in P and ZT
is in Lγ(Q). The estimate (11) in Lemma 3.2 implies that
EQ
∫ T
0
G∗t (Z¯t − St)dt=EQ
∫ T
0
G∗t (Mt − St)dt≤
∫ T
0
ℓ(ε)dt≤ Tℓ(ε)
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for a continuous (deterministic) function ℓ, which clearly tends to 0 as ε→ 0.
Now the claim follows by Theorem 4.2. 
Theorem 4.4 has an immediate implication for fractional Brownian mo-
tion. The arbitrage properties of fractional Brownian motion have long
been delicate: in a frictionless setting it admits arbitrage of the second
kind [Rogers (1997)] but, with proportional transaction costs, it does not
even have arbitrage of the first kind [Guasoni, Ra´sonyi and Schachermayer
(2008)]. With price-impact, the above theorem implies that it does not admit
arbitrage of the second kind, since it satisfies the CFS-D property [Guasoni,
Ra´sonyi and Schachermayer (2008)]. Whether arbitrage of the first kind (a
positive, and possibly strictly positive, payoff from nothing) exists is still an
open question.
5. Utility maximization. This section discusses utility maximization in
the model of Section 2. The first result (Theorem 5.1 below) shows that
optimal strategies exist under a simple integrability assumption, which is
easy to check in practice. In particular, optimal strategies exist regardless of
arbitrage, since such opportunities are necessarily limited. Put differently,
the budget equation is nonlinear. Therefore, one cannot add to an optimal
strategy an arbitrage opportunity, and expect the resulting wealth to be the
sum.
The second result establishes the first-order condition for utility maxi-
mization, which provides a simple criterion for optimality, and helps under-
stand the differences with the corresponding results for frictionless markets
and proportional transaction costs. In particular, it shows that the analogue
of a shadow price for price-impact models is a hypothetical frictionless price
for which the optimal strategy would coincide with the execution price of
the same strategy in the original price-impact model. This notion reduces
to that of shadow price for markets with proportional transaction costs.
Importantly, these results consider only utilities defined on the real line,
such as exponential utility, but exclude power and logarithmic utilities,
which are defined only for positive values. This setting is consistent with
the definition of feasible strategies, which do not constrain wealth to remain
positive. When establishing optimality of a given strategy in such a setting,
one technical challenge is to show that the resulting wealth processes are
martingales (or just supermartingales) with respect to appropriate reference
measures (these are martingale measures in the frictionless case). Lemma 5.6
below implies such a property for any feasible strategy and hence forms the
main ingredient of the proof of Theorem 5.5. Finally, since the focus is on
utility functions defined on a single variable, and with price impact there is
no scalar notion of portfolio value, the results below assume for simplicity
that all strategies begin and end with cash only.
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Let W be an arbitrary real-valued random variable (representing a ran-
dom endowment) and c ∈R the investor’s initial capital.
Theorem 5.1. Let U :R→ R be concave and nondecreasing, and let
E|U(c + B +W )| <∞ hold for the market bound B =
∫ T
0 G
∗
t (−St)dt in
Lemma 3.2. Under Assumption 2.3, there is φ∗ ∈A′(U, c) such that
EU(V 0T (cˇ, φ
∗) +W ) = sup
φ∈A′(u,c)
EU(V 0T (cˇ, φ) +W ),
where A′(U, c) = {φ ∈A :V iT (cˇ, φ) = 0, i= 1, . . . , d,EU−(V
0
T (cˇ, φ)+W )<∞}.
This theorem applies, in particular, for U bounded above andW bounded
below.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Corollary 3.6 implies that
C ′ := cˇ+ (C ∩ {X :Xi = 0 a.s., i= 1, . . . , d})
is closed in probability.
Let φ(n) be a sequence in A′(U, c) with
lim
n→∞
EU(V 0T (cˇ, φ(n)) +W ) = sup
φ∈A′(U,c)
EU(V 0T (cˇ, φ) +W ).
Since V 0T (cˇ, φ(n)) ≤ c + B a.s. for all n, by Lemma 9.8.1 of Delbaen and
Schachermayer (2006) there are convex combinations such that
∑M(n)
j=n αj(n)×
V 0T (cˇ, φ(j))→ V a.s. for some [−∞, c + B]-valued random variable V . By
convexity of G, we have that for φ˜(n) :=
∑M(n)
j=n αj(n)φ(j),
V 0T (cˇ, φ˜(n))≥
M(n)∑
j=n
αj(n)V
0
T (cˇ, φ(j)),
so
∑M(n)
j=n αj(n)VT (cˇ, φ(j)) ∈C
′ for each n.
By the concavity of U ,
EU
(
W +
M(n)∑
j=n
αj(n)V
0
T (cˇ, φ(j))
)
≥
M(n)∑
j=n
αj(n)EU(V
0
T (cˇ, φ(j)) +W ).
Fatou’s lemma implies that EU(V ) ≥ supφ∈A′(u)EU(V
0
T (cˇ, φ) +W ), in
particular, V is finite-valued and hence Vˇ ∈C ′ by the convexity and closed-
ness of C ′. It follows that V = V 0T (cˇ, φ
∗) − Y 0 for some φ∗ ∈ A′(U, c) and
Y ∈ L0+. Clearly, EU(V
0
T (cˇ, φ
∗) +W − Y 0) = supφ∈A′(U,c)Eu(V
0
T (cˇ, φ) +W ).
Necessarily, EU(V 0T (cˇ, φ
∗) +W ) = supφ∈A′(U,c)EU(V
0
T (cˇ, φ) +W ) as well.
10
This completes the proof. 
10Note that U can be constant on an (infinite) interval hence Y 0 6= 0 is possible.
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Remark 5.2. Theorem 5.1 can also be proved with
A′′(U, c) = {φ ∈A :V iT (cˇ, φ)≥ 0, i= 1, . . . , d,EU−(V
0
T (cˇ, φ) +W )<∞}
in lieu of A′(U, c). Note that the two optimization problems are not equiv-
alent, due to illiquidity.
Remark 5.3. Let us assume that S is nonnegative and one-dimensional.
We may replace A′(U, c) in Theorem 5.1 by
A′+(U, c) := {φ ∈A :St(ω) +G(ω, t, φt(ω))/φt(ω)≥ 0 when φt(ω) 6= 0,
V iT (cˇ, φ)≥ 0, i= 1, . . . , d,EU−(V
0
T (cˇ, φ) +W )<∞},
that is, we may restrict our class of strategies to those for which the instan-
taneous execution price is nonnegative, as in Remark 3.8 above.
Remark 5.4. The proofs of Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 3.5 use Lem-
mata 9.8.1 and 15.1.4 in Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006). They could be
replaced, with minor modifications, with Komlo´s’s theorem [Komlo´s (1967)]
and its extensions [Balder (1989), v. Weizsa¨cker (2004)].
While the previous result shows the existence of optimal strategies, the
next theorem provides a sufficient conditions for a strategy’s optimality,
through a variant of the usual first-order condition.
Theorem 5.5. Let Assumption 2.3 hold, and
(a) let U be concave, continuously differentiable, with U ′ strictly decreasing,
and
U(x)≤−C|x|δ, x≤ 0,(36)
for some C > 0 and δ > 1;
(b) denoting by U˜ the convex conjugate function of U , that is,
U˜(y) := sup
x∈R
{U(x)− xy}, y > 0;
(c) let W be a bounded random variable;
(d) let Q ∈ P be such that
dQ/dP ∈Lη(P ),(37)
where (1/η) + (1/δ) = 1;
(e) let Gt(·) be P × Leb-a.s. continuously differentiable in x and G
′
t(·) is
strictly increasing;
(f) let Z be a ca`dla`g process with ZT ∈ L
γ′(Q) for some γ′ > γ and let φ∗ be
a feasible strategy such that, for some y∗ > 0, the following conditions
hold:
SUPERLINEAR FRICTIONS 27
(i) Z is a Q-martingale;
(ii) U ′(V 0T (x,φ
∗) +W ) = y∗(dQ/dP ) a.s.;
(iii) Zt = St +G
′
t(φ
∗
t ) a.s. in P × Leb-a.e.
Then the strategy φ∗ is optimal for the problem
max
φ∈A′(U,c)
E[U(V 0T (x,φ) +W )].(38)
Proof. For any (φt)t≥0 ∈A
′(U, c) the final payoff equals
V 0T (x,φ) = x−
∫ T
0
Stφt dt−
∫ T
0
Gt(φt)dt.(39)
Let Zt be as in the statement of the theorem, and rewrite the above payoff
as
V 0T (x,φ) = x−
∫ T
0
Ztφt dt+
∫ T
0
(Zt − St)φt dt−
∫ T
0
Gt(φt)dt.
By definition of G∗t , it follows that
V 0T (x,φ)≤ x−
∫ T
0
Ztφt dt+
∫ T
0
G∗t (Zt − St)dt,(40)
and equality holds if Zt−St =G
′
t(φt), P ×Leb-a.s., that is, when (iii) holds.
It follows from Lemma 5.6 that
0≤EQ
[(
x− V 0T (x,φ) +
∫ T
0
G∗t (Zt − St)dt
)]
.(41)
Thus, for any payoff V 0T (x,φ) +W and any y > 0 the following holds:
E[U(V 0T (x,φ) +W )]
≤E
[
U(V 0T (x,φ) +W )
(42)
+ y(dQ/dP )
(
x− V 0T (x,φ) +
∫ T
0
G∗t (Zt − St)dt
)]
≤E
[
U˜(y(dQ/dP )) + y(dQ/dP )
(∫ T
0
G∗t (Zt − St)dt+W
)]
+ yx.
If (iii) is satisfied then there is equality in (40) above. If, in addition, (ii)
is satisfied then both inequalities in (42) are equalities for y = y∗. Thus, if
conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) hold for φ∗ then, by (42),
E[U(V 0T (x,φ
∗) +W )]
=E
[
U˜(y∗(dQ/dP )) + y∗(dQ/dP )
(∫ T
0
G∗t (Zt − St)dt+W
)]
+ y∗x.
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For all φ ∈A′(U, c)
E[U(V 0T (x,φ) +W )]
≤E
[
U˜(y∗(dQ/dP )) + y∗(dQ/dP )
(∫ T
0
G∗t (Zt − St)dt+W
)]
+ y∗x,
again by (42). Hence, the strategy φ∗ is indeed optimal. 
Lemma 5.6. Under the assumptions of the previous theorem, any φ ∈
A′(U, c) satisfies
EQ
∫ T
0
φtZt dt= 0.
Proof. Assume T = 1. Define
Φ+t :=
∫ t
0
(φs)+ ds, Φ
−
t :=
∫ t
0
(φs)− ds.
We show that EQ
∫ 1
0 Zt dΦ
+
t −EQ
∫ 1
0 Zt dΦ
−
t = 0.
Since φ ∈ A′(U, c), (36), (37) and Ho¨lder’s inequality imply that
EQ[V
0
1 (x,φ)]− <∞, hence Lemma 3.4 implies that
EQ
∫ 1
0
|φt|
β(1 + |St|)
β dt <∞,
a fortiori,
EQ(Φ
+
1 )
β =EQ
(∫ 1
0
(φt)+ dt
)β
<∞.(43)
Define Φ+t (n) := Φ
+(kn(t)/n) where
kn(t) := max
{
i ∈N :
i
n
≤ t
}
and observe that dΦ+t (n)→ dΦ
+
t a.s. in the sense of weak convergence of
measures on B([0,1]). As Zt is a.s. ca`dla`g, its trajectories have countably
many points of discontinuity (a.s.). By dΦ+t ≪ Leb, this implies
Y +n :=
∫ 1
0
Zt dΦ
+
t (n)→
∫ 1
0
Zt dΦ
+
t =: Y
+,
almost surely. Furthermore,∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
Zt dΦ
+
t (n)
∣∣∣∣
(44)
=
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
k=1
Zk/n[Φ
+
k/n(n)−Φ
+
(k−1)/n(n)]
∣∣∣∣∣≤ supt |Zt|Φ+1 ,
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where supt∈[0,T ] |Zt| ∈L
γ′(Q) by assumption and Φ+1 ∈L
β(Q) by (43). It fol-
lows by Ho¨lder’s inequality that the sequence Y +n is Q-uniformly integrable,
so EQY
+
n →EQY
+, n→∞. From (44), we get, noting that Φ+0 (n) = 0,
EQY
+
n = EQ
[
n−1∑
l=0
(Zl/n −Z(l+1)/n)Φ
+
l/n(n)
]
+EQZ1Φ
+
1 (n)
(45)
= EQZ1Φ
+
1 (n),
by the Q-martingale property of Z. Analogously, as n→∞,
EQY
−
n =EQZ1Φ
−
1 (n)→EQY
−,
where Y −n is defined analogously to Y
+
n using dΦ
−
t instead of dΦ
+
t and
Y − :=
∫ 1
0
Zt dΦ
−
t .
Since Φ1(n) = Φ1 = 0, (45) implies that EQ(Y
+
n − Y
−
n ) = 0 for all n, whence
also
EQ(Y
+ − Y −) =EQ
∫ T
0
φtZt dt= 0,
completing the proof. 
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